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We propose the use of the psychological contract as 
an alternative theoretical lens to study sustained 
participation and engagement in open source, which is 
often used as an example of new forms of digitized 
independent work. Psychological contracts are the set of 
beliefs held by individuals of their personal exchange 
with an organization and other actors with which they 
work. While previous literature has tended to study 
inducements (e.g., intrinsic or extrinsic motivation) on 
its own, the psychological contract studies the relation 
between an individual’s expected inducements and 
contributions. If these expectations are unmet, a breach 
can take place that will affect contributor engagement. 
We suggest the usefulness of this theory in 
understanding why and how open source participants 
decide to stop or reduce their involvement. Participants 
hold multiple psychological contracts with the project, 
fellow developers, and users. The findings show that 
breach can be experienced with all of them either due to 
unmet contributions or inducements. We suggest further 
research into such breaches is required to understand 
their consequences on the sustainability of open source 
projects. 
1. Introduction and background 
Open source software are computer programs that 
have traditionally been built by volunteers [1]. These 
volunteers donate their time and effort to collaborate in 
developing code and documentation, which they make 
available to other developers who can, in turn, share and 
modify them. Recent surveys indicate the established 
role that open source plays in today’s economy, with 
90% of IT leaders reporting using open source [2] and 
contributing £43.1bn yearly to the UK’s GDP [3]. Open 
source development has increased in many countries, 
with a recent study suggesting that the passing of a 
French law that promoting open source led to an increase 
of 600000 yearly contributions [4].  
Open source projects have been considered 
examples of the new and growing forms of digitized 
and independent work [5, 6]. Because of its reliance on 
volunteers, a key recurrent question in open source has 
been why participants contribute to open source 
projects [7]. Lerner and Tirole ask [8:198]: “Why 
should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute 
freely to the provision of a public good?” 
At the heart of this question lies the preoccupation 
and wonderment about the sustainability of open source 
[9]. Indeed, definitions of sustainability often depend 
on the continued decision of contributors to keep 
participating. A key definition of open source 
sustainability borrowed from commons ecological 
studies is whether it is capable to continuously produce 
value to its stakeholders [1, 10]. This value can only 
continuously be produced if there is such participation. 
It is critical for software projects to be maintained, bugs 
corrected, libraries updated, otherwise the project’s 
value may become eroded in time [11]. Researchers 
have thus suggested that sustained participation is 
necessary for open source to be sustainable [12, 13]. 
Yet, participants’ engagement is often fleeting and we 
still lack theoretical mechanisms to explain why this so.  
To remedy this gap, the literature ha heavily relied 
on psychological and organizational behaviour theories 
[14, 15], namely self-determination theory (SDT) and 
social exchange theory, to explain why contributors 
keep contributing. SDT, in particular, has been used to 
explain what motivates contributors to participate [16]. 
According to such studies, open source contributors 
have high levels of intrinsic motivation, particularly 
those who prolong their participation beyond the short-
term [17]. Personal enjoyment and learning 
opportunities are repeatedly cited as motivational 
drivers [18]. Learning new skills and self-improvement 
is particularly important, with surveys consistently 
placing such intrinsic motivation as a key reason for 
contributing to open source [19, 20]. 
Research has also suggested that more extrinsic 
motivations also matter for continued participation. 





Work on open source is often a good signal to 
employers, with participants showing off skills and 
social capital from their participation in open source 
communities [21]. Other strong extrinsic motivators are 
need and use-value (i.e. a developer scratching an itch) 
[22], gaining status [23], or financial rewards [24]).  
Not all participants are likely to share in the same 
way the resulting gains from their participation [25], 
with some contributors reaping far less extrinsic benefits 
than others [26, 27]. Certain performed tasks signal 
looked-after skills by market actors such as managerial 
experience [21]. Certain profiles of contributors, then, 
have little choice but to rely on intrinsic motivations far 
more than others, if, for example, they do not have social 
capital to have returns from their participation. 
Inversely, those contributors who are more socially 
inserted spend less resources fitting into the community 
[12], meaning that the potential extrinsic reward is 
inherently greater to those who are already insiders. 
Alternatively, those contributors who do not see 
financial rewards as problematic do not perceive 
crowding out effects on their intrinsic motivation [24]. 
Indeed, motivations may differ vastly between 
contributors since open source projects are made up of 
highly heterogeneous actors, including firms and their 
employees, voluntary participants with differing levels 
of commitment, software users, public institutions, etc. 
[28], who share their work as part of a community. 
The reliance of SDT theories to explain why 
contributors keep participating [14], may be 
problematic. First, open source is a complex 
environment in which mingle hobby-like and 
commercial interests, making it difficult to parse 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations [25]. For example, 
enjoying learning skills can be both placed as an intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation [25]. Second, SDT theories 
exclusively look at inducements and what participants 
can obtain from their contributions. Even those more 
extrinsic drivers that take into account individuals' 
willingness to contribute to the common good as a 
motivation [23, 29], still answer the same fundamental 
question: 'what do I receive from my involvement?' If 
the rewards are sufficient, then the individuals decide to 
continue contributing, otherwise, they stop. To our 
knowledge, this work investigates only why people 
contribute but overlooks exploring why they stop, 
latently assuming that the latter is merely the result of 
contributing conditions not being met.  
To circumvent limitations in SDT, an important 
second research stream aims to explain why contributors 
sustain their participation building on mechanisms of 
social exchange theory such as gift culture and 
reciprocity [30, 31]. Osterloh and Rota [32], intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations are not sufficient explanations 
on their own to understand how open source is sustained, 
extending Ostrom [33] to propose structural and 
governance mechanisms which supports such 
motivational aspects found in open source. In their 
reading, motivation theory remains important, but 
voluntary contributions can only be made sense of by 
looking at the specific open source dynamics that 
ensure certain behaviors are monitored and rewarded. 
The way these mechanisms are generally deployed in 
open source studies presupposes a sharing culture much 
more calculative than the anthropological studies from 
which they were inspired [34]. von Krogh et al. 
[35:1233], for example, defines social exchange as a 
way in which "individuals form relationships to 
maximize rewards and minimize costs." There is an 
expectation in open source that freely contributed code 
will be protected by mechanisms that ensure that 
nothing untoward is going to happen [32], giving rise 
to specific work on governance structures as projects 
mature [36], while creating a culture that suggests there 
should be reciprocity [37]. Again, this stream of 
literature has not specifically delved into why 
participants stop contributing, focusing mainly and why 
they do participate. 
This paper builds on the insights derived by both 
these streams to understand specifically why people 
stop participating. Research often remarks on the 
peculiarity of open source that many such projects and 
communities fail [38]. Yet, there has been little 
research on why projects fail, with studies focusing 
instead on understanding how successful ones manage 
to sustain contributions. We propose that people do not 
stop enjoying learning new skills or other such intrinsic 
motivations, or that they stop perceiving open source as 
a good signal for career prospects. Instead, they reflect 
on whether the expectations they had regarding the 
exchange between what they put in what they receive 
are met. One project may meet expectations making 
them sustain their participation, while another will not. 
In this sense, the two questions: why do people 
contribute to open source and why do they stop?, are 
intimately related. Understanding why people stop 
contributing to open source sheds light on why they 
decide to keep contributing. As such, we posit that there 
is a dynamic relationship between individuals and their 
decision to continue or stop contributing to open source 
projects.  
To answer these two questions, we analyze the 
mailing lists of a large open source project over a period 
of four years, focusing on contributors’ narratives 
regarding their ongoing participation. To do so, we rely 
on the psychological contract as a theoretical lens. The 
reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents the theoretical framework. Section 
three describes the methods of the study, section four 
presents the findings and section five discusses them. 
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We conclude offering practical implications and 
acknowledging the limitations of the study.  
2. Theoretical lens 
The psychological contract (PC) is a framework 
commonly used in the human resource management and 
organizational behavior literatures. It builds on 
administrative theory to understand work relationships 
as cooperative systems [39]. The PC is defined as the set 
of ‘individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, 
regarding terms of an exchange agreement ... [and] is 
potentially idiosyncratic and unique to each person who 
agrees to it’ [40:9–10]. Psychological contracts are 
restricted to individuals; organizations cannot have a PC 
of their own and are merely the frame within which 
individuals form theirs [41]. The PC can thus be 
described as the mental picture that individuals form 
regarding their personal exchange with their 
organization. It is the mechanism that allows them to 
keep track of, on the one hand, the contributions they 
offer to their organization and, on the other hand, the 
inducements they receive from their organization [42].  
Although the PC lens has been primarily used in the 
context of employment relationships (i.e. “work that is 
performed under contractual arrangements and involves 
material rewards” [43:109]), several authors have 
pointed out that any relationship involving expectations 
between parties is subject to the development of a PC 
[40, 44]. Although open source participants are 
generally volunteers who do not have an employment 
relationship with the project, they arguably develop 
expectations and beliefs regarding their interaction with 
different parties that are involved in the development of 
software. 
The PC is a helpful lens through which to investigate 
sustained participation in open source for several 
reasons. First, it allows exploring open source 
participation as an exchange phenomenon in which both 
contributions and inducements play a role, rather than 
just inducements (what people get from participating, 
which is the prevalent approach in the literature).   
Contributions have been described as ‘payments to 
the organization’ [39:85]. They can take very diverse 
forms ranging from adequate job performance and low 
absenteeism [45], to working overtime or being 
constantly available to work [46]. Inducements are 
rewards that are offered to the workers [47:1113]. They 
can be extrinsic (e.g. wages) or intrinsic (e.g. interesting 
job) [48]. 
Administrative theory highlights that a situation of 
imbalance between contributions demanded from the 
employee and inducements offered to the employee 
cannot endure, because it will push the organization to 
change the arrangement or the employee to quit [49]. 
From a PC perspective, such balance relies on 
individual perceptions and expectations rather than on 
objective and measurable facts [50]. In this context, the 
concept of ‘breach’ emerges as essential. PC breach is 
defined as the employee’s perception that “the terms of 
their psychological contracts have not been adequately 
fulfilled” [51:226]. When breach takes place, the 
individual no longer believes the other party to uphold 
their end of the bargain, thus making the exchange 
unsustainable in the long run. For example, Shaikh and 
colleagues [52] observed a number of breaches of trust 
between developers in her research on version control 
of the Linux kernel, in particular, when a non-free 
versioning system was introduced.  
Second, the PC is a particularly useful framework 
to understand individual exchanges in which many 
things are “legitimately expected or fulfilled by the 
contracting parties” (Cooke et al., 2004; 280) that are 
never explicitly written down. This can be the case of 
both contributions and inducements. Even if some job 
requirements clearly expressed, many are latent 
expectations that are seldom made explicit (Conway 
and Briner, 2005). Although extrinsic inducements, 
such as wages or holidays, tend to be formally reflected 
in the work contract, inducements can also be 
intangible, unwritten and mainly intrinsic (e.g. learning 
opportunities or meaningful work). In employment 
relations, some expectations, particularly regarding 
basic job demands (e.g. work hours) and rewards (e.g. 
wages), are made explicit in the work contract. Since in 
open source there are no formal written contracts all 
expectations are a matter of individual perceptions. 
Moreover, this distinct individual focus of PC theory 
adds nuance to open source studies drawing on social 
exchange theory. Indeed, the PC framework enables us 
to focus on individual contributors and their 
understandings and perceptions regarding how they 
contribute and what they get in return, rather than 
looking at the exchange itself, which would be the focus 
of social exchange theory.  
Third, the PC enables to look at multiple 
relationships simultaneously (multi-foci approach).  
The literature suggests individuals develop various 
simultaneous psychological contracts with different 
agents [53]. These contracts are concurrent and 
although they are separate, they may be interrelated. 
For instance, the experience of psychological contract 
breach with one agent might influence the evolution of 
expectations towards other agents [54]. In the context 
of organizations, this multi-foci approach may include 
co-workers, trade unions, managers or clients [55] as 
separate agents that workers build psychological 
contracts with [53]. In the context of open source, it is 
likely that participants also develop multiple parallel 
psychological contracts with the project, the 
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community, other developers or, when present, with any 
company involved. Whether or not this is the case, is an 
empirical question that is still to be explored.  
Finally, these relationships evolve over time and the 
PC enables to capture that evolution. Employees 
continuously perceive and process messages sent by the 
organization, pertaining to obligations they owe their 
employer and to the incentives they will receive in return 
for fulfilling these obligations [56]. PC are thus 
constantly evolving on the basis of unfolding events and 
interpretations of these events. This intrinsic ‘on-
goingness’ is a distinctive and essential part of their 
nature [44:32]. Contrary to self-determination theory 
which tends to assume the stability of motivations, the 
PC offers a dynamic account.  
3. Methodology  
3.1. Case & Data Collection 
To carry out this research, we have followed a case 
study design [57]. Following psychological contract 
research [56], we are interested in exploring how people 
understand and describe their exchange relationships.  
For this reason, we have focused our attention on 
LibreOffice. LibreOffice is a fork of OpenOffice created 
after suffering from a community and project crisis when 
sponsor Sun Microsystems was acquired by Oracle. 
LibreOffice was started by core developers who were 
apprehensive of Oracle’s implication. We chose this 
project for multiple reasons. First, the project involves 
both company employees and volunteer workers, likely 
holding different and even competing expectations. The 
Document Foundation which governs the project has 
employees, while attracting a large number of volunteers 
as well. Second, its history of company involvements 
may have left a lasting impression on the participants' 
articulation of expectations with regards to powerful 
actors. On the other hand, LibreOffice has been adopted 
by multiple public institutions. Third, because the fork 
of the source code would likely raise some issues to the 
surface through which we could gleam the existence of 
psychological contracts in participants. In so doing, we 
were hoping to showcase capacity of psychological 
contracts to theorize on why contributors stop 
participating. Finally, the project is established, leaving 
room for psychological contract evolution. 
In particular, we collected and analyzed the 
discussion mailing list, amounting to more than 9000 
pages from the years 2009--2013. Given the large 
dataset, we proceeded to identify relevant email threads 
through keyword search. Keywords related to 
contributions (e.g., responsibili*, dut*, demand*), 
inducements (e.g., motivat*, reward*, incentiv*), breach 
(e.g., disappoint*, betray*), fulfilment (e.g., pleased, 
grateful), and expectations in general (e.g., expect*, 
promis*, belie*). This resulted in 159 email threads to 
be coded in-depth.  
3.2. Data analysis process 
Mailing list analysis is a common investigative 
method in open source studies (e.g., [58]). A key 
advantage of studying mailing lists is that they allow us 
to place participants’ accounts in context and to 
evaluate statements in relation to other actors who can 
agree or disagree on individuals’ perceptions. 
The coding process followed template analysis 
precepts [59]. In template analysis, data are coded using 
themes derived from a set of codes (i.e., the template). 
This list of codes can be derived from a number of 
sources, including the literature and theoretical 
frameworks. Other codes can be added into the 
template while coding progresses. In this sense, 
template analysis can be considered a combination of 
top-down and bottom-up coding [60]. 
The coding process involved multiple stages. First, 
the initial coding template was derived from the 
literature and the psychological contract theory. 
Second, the emails were read independently by two 
coders. Specialized mailing lists such as the developer 
list contained fewer references to psychological 
contract constructs and were discarded to focus on the 
discuss list. Taking into account the large dataset, we 
decided to code those threads containing emails that 
were relevant to the topic. The two coders analyzed 
these threads independently and the findings were later 
discussed and contrasted between the researchers. The 
coders held regular progress meetings to ensure 
consistency in their coding practices and develop a 
common template. Coding was done at the paragraph 
level with parallel coding [59]. The template was 
revised multiple times as the coding process went on, 
with a number of issues from the data pushing us to 
create new codes and sub-codes. For instance, the 
initial code ‘inducements’ was subdivided to reflect 
which agent they were expected from (e.g. the project, 
the developers or the users). The same happened for the 
code ‘contributions’.  
4. Findings 
Participants’ accounts do not only reveal their 
expectations regarding open source but also suggest 
why they keep volunteering for this work or why they 
stop doing so. The psychological contract emerges as a 
very useful theoretical lens to understand these 
processes. In particular, we observe that open source 
participants develop different psychological contracts 
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with at least three types of agents and that can they 
experience breach with any one of them.  
4.1. Participation in open source through a 
psychological contract lens: entangled 
idiosyncratic contributions and inducements 
The analysis of the mailing lists indicates that 
participants develop a mental picture of what they expect 
to contribute and what inducements they expect to 
receive when participating in an open source project. 
These inducements and contributions are tied together 
and build an overall picture in participants’ minds 
regarding what it means to be an open source participant. 
Some provide very specific accounts of such 
expectations, suggesting that in their minds, 
reciprocation is more than a vague idea of having future 
returns for their work. On the contrary their individual 
understanding of the exchange is often very concrete.  
These inducements and contributions are tied in their 
narratives. For instance, when presenting his candidacy 
for the board of directors, one of them said:  
 
“What motivates me to work for TDF? It is my firm 
belief that an independent, open, and meritocratic 
organization is the right home for a project the size, and 
the diversity, of LibreOffice. Being one of the founding 
members, I consider it my duty to help creating, shaping, 
and maintaining such an organisation.”  
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2011) 
 
This quote illustrates the participant’s expectations 
and beliefs regarding his interaction with The Document 
Foundation, indicating that he expects to contribute by 
‘creating, shaping and maintaining’ the organization. In 
exchange, he expects the organization to be 
‘independent, open, and meritocratic’. Another major 
actor in the community, running for the board of 
directors, described his psychological contract in the 
following terms: 
 
“I've just tried to do what I know best: provide some 
marketing advice, and try to make TDF and LibreOffice 
as popular as possible by engaging the media. I have 
also gone a few miles around to represent TDF at 
conferences in Chicago, Zagreb and Athens, and I will 
also be speaking at LinuxCon Europe in Prague in 
October. What motivates me to work for TDF? I have a 
professional challenge: with a marketing budget of zero 
(in letters it looks bigger), outsmart corporations with a 
marketing budget with six or more zeros (and with a 
number in front which makes it more significant) (…) I 
promise that I will never write a single line of code (…) 
I will handle some marketing and media relations. I am 
also going to have an awful lot of fun”  
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2011) 
 
His words underline that he does not see himself 
contributing with writing code but with other activities 
that support the project (such as marketing). In return 
for this work, he expects to be challenged and to have 
fun. Again, this exchange process is very specific 
suggesting that changes in inducements would have 
particular effects on the participant’s contributions and 
vice versa. Participants do not hope for intangible 
undefined perks in exchange for a vague notion of 
contribution. They have a clear idea of what the 
exchange is supposed to be even if this idea is generally 
latent and not verbalized.  
We also find evidence that the psychological 
contract developed by open source participants is 
idiosyncratic: each individual participant may develop 
a different one. Actual contributions and inducements 
are seldom spelled out. Therefore, there is ample room 
for participants to have different understandings of their 
exchange relationship.  This is particularly salient when 
participants discuss certain specific inducements such 
as pay or membership. For instance, in one of the 
mailing lists a participant said: 
 
“To me it is essential that the eco system is 
primarily kept intact by “real” volunteers… and that 
paid volunteers (sorry could not find a better 
expression) which have more time and resources are 
not taking over.”  
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2013) 
  
From this person’s perspective, pay should not be a 
generalized inducement. In their minds, that is not part 
of the desirable exchange and may risk the project’s 
identity. On the contrary, another participant stated:  
 
“I *work* on LibreOffice. If I wasn’t paid to do it, 
I doubt I would touch it” 
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2011) 
 
This person does not only expect to be paid. He 
states that his participation is dependent on receiving 
this inducement and that, if this were not the case, he 
would likely withdraw from contributing. These 
contrasting quotes underline the importance of 
individual beliefs in developing exchange 
relationships. They also suggest that sooner or later, 
one of these participants will experience breach 
because their contrasting expectations cannot be 
simultaneously met. Different psychological contracts 
and the emergence of breach can thus explain why 




4.2. Multi-foci psychological contracts 
 
We find that individuals create expectations 
regarding their relationships with a variety of actors 
involved in open source projects. In particular, 
participants develop parallel psychological contracts 
with the project (i.e. the Foundation), the community of 
developers and the users. These psychological contracts 
entail different expectations regarding contributions and 
inducements. Table 1 presents examples of quotes that 
illustrate the contents of the psychological contracts 
developed with each of these agents and examples of 
how inducements and contributions are exchanged in 
the minds of participants for each of them.  
The quotes in Table 1 underline that open source 
participants develop a network of expectations, 
promises and obligations with a variety of agents who 
are involved in the process of creating open source 
software. These relationships can potentially affect the 
sustainability of individual participation in different 
ways because they entail that psychological contract 
breach can happen at different levels.   
 
Table 1: Illustrative quotes of multi-foci psychological contract in open source
 Contributions Inducements Exchange 
The project / 
Foundation 
“If you look at what is in the 
email and the wiki page I 
believe you will see that 
translating is most certainly 
considered contributing. 
Same is true for working a 
LibreOffice booth at a fair 
or linux fest.” 
“If a third party attempted to sue 
You for (say) some violation of 
their copyright, then the 
Foundation can step in and say 
"we are responsible. Bernhard 
was acting according to our 
wishes. sue us, not him." The 
theory is that a judge will then 
remove you from the case, and 
put Apache in there.” 
“I am willing to setup a task on 
Bounty Source and chip in $100, 
but maybe TDF can consider to 
donate a new laptop to a 
volunteer who promises to work 
on the issues? Someone donated 
hardware to a Gnome developer 
and they got some fixes into 3.10 




“I have a problem when 
it comes to rewarding 
people that refuse to make 
an effort to learn. Notice, I 
said "refuse", not 
"incapable of" 
“It is therefore by design (…), 
that contribution to LibreOffice 
is rewarded, e.g. by being 
empowered to decide on 
directions or designs or code, 
vote for various things including 
the board, etc.” 
“Membership in the community is 
based on merit.”  
Users “You don’t want to take any 
chances with data or 
formatting loss, it’s the duty 
of programmers to 
warn/protect users against 
risky behaviours” (2011) 
“I don't see why you would 
expect a 'users first' approach 
to change current processes 
significantly. BUT, in my view 
there is a considerable potential 
upside because it will make the 
user feel more valued, it will 
make the step to deeper 
involvement seem smaller (…), 
and it will probably make it 
slightly more likely that users 
will take that step, which is what 
we all want” 
“Users are users. They get rights 
from the software freedom 
conveyed by the licenses we use. 
They do not get anything else, 
unless they want to become 
contributors. Anything else is 
toxic for the community and 
profoundly demotivational” 
 
4.3 Experiences of psychological contract 
breach in open source 
 
Breach happens when participants feel their 
expectations are unfulfilled. This can take place for 
any of the above-described psychological contracts 
(see table 1). Sometimes, participants will feel the 
psychological contract with the project has been 
broken. In the analyzed case, this was particularly 
salient when a firm got involved in the project. As a 
result, many participants voiced concern over either 
not expecting to contribute towards the interests of a 
for profit organization known for its closed source 
practices or over disappointment with expected 
inducements. For instance, a participant described his 
intention to withdraw from the project after a firm got 
involved in the following terms: 
 
“Any further contribution to that project has really 
no sense from a (…) volunteer’s point of view (…) a 
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direct contribution to Apache Ooo is rather risky (“I 
give you something and… ehi, you have no duty to give 
me something back!! (…) That isn’t, really what I want 
from a *free software* project. Plain and simple J” 
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2011) 
    
Breach can also take place at the users’ or the 
developers’ levels. One of the generally expected 
inducements is the respect of the community. When 
participants feel their interactions with others do not 
show such respect, they can feel disappointed and as a 
result, decreased their involvement in the project. One 
of the participants’ accounts illustrates this type of 
breach: 
 
“I'm shocked that a Discuss topic where 54 
messages from many people (several of them opposing 
and presenting valid arguments against) was totally 
dismissed because someone decided that it was time to 
change and the main argument was that "it was 
outdated". (…) Communities don't behave like this. 
(Disappointed)” 
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2012) 
 
The findings also indicate that unfulfillment can 
sometimes be related to the participants’ perceived 
inability to meet their expected contributions, rather 
than about unmet inducement. A participant described 
how he was abandoning the project because he felt his 
contribution, given his personal life responsibilities, 
was not at his expected level.  
 
“After quite an amount of time and a lot of work 
(…) I have to tell you that I'll have to stop my activities 
in this great community. Even if I tried not to 
compromise my real life by my LibreOffice activities, 
I had to realize, that I can't reach this goal (…). 
LibreOffice activities have ever been fun, rewarding 
and challenging - improving my skills (not only my 
English) and giving back appreciation that showed me 
that my work is important to the community. It's hard 
to step back and let you work on your own.” 
LibreOffice discussion mailing list (2011) 
 
When experiencing breach at any level, 
participants may stop contributing towards the project, 
community or the users, or reduce their contributions 
to align them more fairly with the inducements they 
feel they receive. 
5. Discussion   
SDT theories focus on why people participate but 
cannot tell us much about why they stop or change 
how much they participate. In this paper, we have 
followed studies that proposed social exchange 
mechanisms to explain why and how people take those 
decisions. In particular, we have relied on the 
psychological contract to argue that sustained 
participation depends on the perceived balance 
between inducements and contributions, rather than 
just rewards. By re-centering the participant as an 
individual in relation with other actors, we have a 
better idea of the complex ecosystem of actors that are 
involved in the decision to continue participating or 
stop doing so.  
Even if the PC lens has been primarily used to 
explore employment relationship, our study suggests 
it can shed light over the behaviors of open source 
participants who are not employees of the project. This 
finding is relevant for the growing literature on the 
digitized economy, which suggests that work that was 
traditionally carried out by full-time employees is now 
in the hands of “a crowd of individual entrepreneurs 
and on-demand workers” [61:7]. The case of open 
source participants is often used as an example of new 
forms of digitized independent work [5]. The PC 
therefore seems a pertinent theoretical lens to expand 
knowledge on this growing stream of workers and how 
they behave.  
The findings highlight that open source 
participants develop simultaneous psychological 
contracts with various significant agents. These multi-
foci psychological contracts [53], can have different 
roles in the participants’ decision to stay engaged with 
the project. The literature points out that the 
multiplicity of expectations and obligations might 
create tensions and contradictions that participants 
have to process [62].  
The concept of breach emerges as key. It helps us 
infer about the possible evolutions of relationships. On 
the one hand, an individual might experience a breach 
with one actor or one kind of actor (e.g., the project), 
but not with others (e.g., new developers, but not core 
developers). In this case, psychological contracts 
between different actors can be seen as independent 
from one another. 
On the other hand, for other participants, a breach 
with one actor can affect their behavior towards other 
participants [54]. This is because the PCs can be 
interlinked. Further research should explore the extent 
to which different levels of breach entail different 
behaviors from participants and which ones are most 
salient in explaining them deciding to stop 
participating. Moreover, often, breach does not always 
result in complete withdrawal. It can also lead to 
reduced contributions or, sometimes to unsocial 
behaviors. Do what extent this is the case in open 
source and may influence the sustainability of a 
project also requires further exploration.  
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Finally, the literature suggests that psychological 
contracts evolve over time. The open source literature 
also suggests that roles change as projects mature [36], 
which may influence the contents of participants 
psychological contracts.  
5.2. Practical contributions  
This paper’s findings suggest a key practical 
implication. Understanding the relational complexity 
of individual experiences involved in decisions to 
continue or stop participation can help code 
maintainers evaluate their work processes. There is a 
growing willingness and preoccupation among the 
open source community to be able to measure and 
reward open source work fairly (e.g., make visible 
documentation contributors). Seeing sustained 
participation from a psychological contract 
perspective could help define community and work 
metrics that better take into account participant 
contributions and propose commensurate 
inducements.  
In addition, the idea that contributors develop 
different psychological contracts with different parties 
indicates that managing the sustainability of open 
source projects is not just about the project and the 
contributors, but about the expectations the latter 
develop with a multiplicity of actors and that such 
expectations may influence one another.  
6. Limitations and conclusion 
These findings may be limited by the specificities 
of the analyzed case. In addition,  although the dataset 
is very large, it was generated a decade ago and the 
actual proportion of relevant threads we could study is 
limited. This is because participants discuss many 
different topics in the mailing lists which are often not 
related to how they see their contributions to the 
project. While the mailing lists provide interesting 
unprompted insights regarding contributors´ 
psychological contracts, further research should 
deepen the findings presented in this paper by delving 
into their narratives regarding their participation. Such 
an approach would require using a diversity of data 
collection methods (e.g., in-depth interviews). In 
addition, the method did not allow us to identify 
individual characteristics of contributors. The 
proposed use of additional data collection methods 
would also provide information on elements such as 
expertise, cultural background, or type of 
employment. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper 
makes two key contributions. First, the analysis of the 
LibreOffice case has shed light on how individual 
open source contributors understand their participation 
and how they develop a myriad of expectations with 
multiple actors, that influence their decision to 
participate or to stop participating. When expectations 
regarding contributions and inducements are unmet, 
contributors may experience psychological contract 
breach which may trigger them to quit. This finding is 
useful for those hoping to develop online communities 
in general. Understanding and managing participants’ 
expectations is thus key to making such communities 
sustainable. Second, the paper shows that PC theory is 
a valid lens to explore the phenomenon of open source 
participation and a fruitful avenue for future research.  
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